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1. INTRODUCTION 
Components, and specially semiconductors (SCs), are, along 
with consumer and industrial electronics, informatics and 
telecommunications, an impórtant integral part of the information 
technology industry. 
This paper deals with the Europen SC industry, and 
particularly with its structural features and future prospects. 
It also tries to point out the challenges that new entrants, such 
,'as South Korea, poses to the European industry, a topic which, 
'unlike those dealing with mature competitors (the US or Japan), 
has not'been yet extensively researched. 
It is very well known that the European electronics industry 
is extremely weak in world competition and has experienced a very 
poor performance in recent years [CCE, 1991J. 
The importance of SCs for the European information 
technology indust~y and even its entire industrial sector does 
not need to be stressed. Since consumer electronics and 
informatics feature a strong dominant position 'of Asian and 
North-american producers', the SC sector is one of the few ones 
in which European presence is yet noticeable. Moreover, the 
ability to design and manufacture ses is probably one'of the keys 
to maintain the competitiveness of the entire information 
technology industry [HUMBERT and PERRAULT, 1991J. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the strategic importance of SCs, 
the European industry is lagging behind US companies (Intel and 
, For Europe, this situation has strong implications: high 
trade deficits, overseas dependence in major vital inputs, ... 
[CCE, 1991: 10J. 
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Motorola) in microprocessors and Japanese (NEC, Toshiba, Hi tachi, 
..• ) and even South Korean (Samsung) firms in memories 2 , devices 
which together r~present, about,.a. third of world SC production 
[OECD, 1992]. 
Moreover, the European SC crisis aggravated in recent years 
because of demand contraction (caused by the decline in the 
computer business), import competition from low-cost countries 
and inward investment by big US and Japanese producers. 
These trends threaten to -dash once and for all European 
companies' hopes for a fully independent technological base. 
Furthermore, the decline has continued despite heavy government 
subsidies, tough protection against imports, and recent strategic 
alliances with US and Japanese companies. 
;:; 
The paper explores the mainreasons of this continuous 
downward trend and also the reactions undertaken by European 
companies in an effort to recapture lost markets. Secondly, the 
inroads of South Korea in world and European markets are briefly 
highlighted. It is suggested that South Korean companies may pose 
~big challenge to the European SC industry in coming years. 
2 SCs may be di vided in three main categories: discrete 
devices, integrated circui ts and optoelectronic device$. The 
second type of SCs represent the bulk of world sales (around four 
fiths). Integrated circuits are mainly memories and 
microprocessors [OECD, 1992]. Memories, such as DRAMs (Dynamic 
Random Access Memories) or SRAMs (Static Random Access Memories), 
are general purpose integrated circui ts used to store large 
quantities of information in binary code in the form of 
electrical charges. Microprocessors are more complex integrated 
circuits used to perform the central functions ofmicrocomputers 
[HOBDAY, 1989: Appendix]. 
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2. THE CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN SC INDUSTRY: REASONS AND REACTIONS 
.... :", ~ . 
The European SC industry is in bad shape. European 
manufacturers' share of world SC sales has be en consistently 
declining in the 1980s and early 1990s: 16 percent in 1979, 12 
percent in 1985 and 10 percent in 1992 (Table 1). The decline in 
the second half of the 1980s in specially worth-noting [DOURILLE-
FEER, 1992: 87-8) because it took place despite 
- recent pan-European support programs, such as JESSI (Joint 
European Submicron Silicon Initiative), launched in 1989 and 
directed towards catching up with the US and Japan by developing 
.64 Megabit (Mb)3 DRAM devices by 1995; 
- protectionism towards imports, under the form of anti-
dumping levies against Japanese and South Korean products, and 
tough local-content rules in SC users' production; 
- strategic alliances with foreign companies, such as the 
partnerships between siemens and IBM (1990), Siemens-IBM-Toshiba 
(1992) or SGS-Thomson and Mitsubishi (1993). 
Moreover, among the 'main European makers (Philips of The 
Netherlands, French-Italian SGS-Thomson and Germany's siemens)', 
non e reaches 5 percent of the worldmarket, which is considered 
3 This very large scale integration (VLSI) technology allows 
for 64 milI ion (or megabit) circuit elements to be condensed onto 
one tiny chip . 
• Philips Semiconductors, based in Eindhoven (Netherlands) 
has plants in The Netherlands, Germany, France and Belgium. SGS-
Thomson Microelectronics was formed from the 1987 merger between 
France's Thomson Semiconductors and Italy's SGS Microelettronica 
and is controlled by the French and Italián governments. It has 
three manufacturing plants in Italy and four in France. Germany's 
Siemens has -fabs in Regensburg (Germany)', Villach (Austria) and 
Corbeil-Essones (France, jointly with IBM). A fourth but smaller 
European producer is UK's GEC-Plessey Semiconductors, with all 
its plants in the United Kingdom [BOULT, 1993: 147). 
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to be the minumum critical share, and only Philips is listed the 
world top-ten ranking of suppliers (Table 2). In'1992, among the 
world '.s ten, largest producers ,'" six"Ylere Japanese 'añd three were 
US-owned. World-wide sales of Intel, NEC or Toshiba are bigger 
than those of the three European companies combined. In 1990 the 
combined world market share for integrated circuits of Philips, 
SGS-Thomson and Siemens was 7.4 per cent while NEC's was 8.9 and 
'Toshiba's 7.7' per cent [DE JONQUIERES, 1991]. 
Furthermore, the European market share of European-owned 
firms hardly reaches one-third, while the own-market share is 70 
per cent in the USand 85 percent in Japan [NAKAMOTO, 1992a]. 
What is more, this share has dec1ined from 44 percent in 1979 to 
34 percent in 1992 (Table 3). Although Philips is yet the biggest 
European market supplier, Siemens and SGS-Thomson, which were no. 
2 and no. 3, respectively, in 1990 and 1991, have been surpassed 
by Intel and Motorola in 1992 (Table 4). 
The main reasons, of this crisis may be summarized as 
",follows: 
- stiff competition from imports, specially from Japan and 
South Korea in memories and from the US in microprocessors. The 
prospects for the next few years are bleak, because European 
Community (EC) tariffs on imported SCs may be downgraded from 14 
to 9 percent to comply with the GATT's Uruguay Round requirements 
and also to, reward pressures from European chip users and US 
producers; 
- massive inward investment from the US and more recently 
.• Japan [NAKAMOTO, 1992b]. The list of non European SC producers 
owning and operating plants il'\ Europe is impressive: Intel in 
Ireland, NEC in Scotland (UK), Toshiba in Germany, Motorola in 
France and Scotland, Hitachi in Germany, Texas Instruments in 
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Germany and Italy, Fujitsu in the UK, Mitsubishi in Germany, IBM 
in Germany and France, .•. Several other smaller companies, such 
as AT&T "",'Analog Devices ¡ BetatnEn'nl, . Burr-Brown, DEC, General 
Semiconductor, ITT and Mational Semiconductor, have also invested 
in Europe [BOULT, 1993: 146). Tariff-jumping reasons, tough 
local-content rules against Japanese screwdriver plants, and 
other factors have prompted foreign direct investment directed 
towards producing locally 4Mb DRAMs (Texas Instruments in Italy, 
Intel, MEC and Fujitsu in the UK, Mitsubishi and Hitachi in 
Germany, ..• ). Those investments will surely lower the import-
penetration ratio (which has already fallen from 44 percent in 
1991 to 20 percent in 1993) but al so raise the proportion of 
foreign production in total output. Recent investments by Texas 
Instruments, Mi tsubishi and Hi tachi may be explained for a number 
40f reasons [SKAPIMKER, 1991): the prospects for completion of the 
" EC single market; tariff-jumping, decisions, along the lines 
"suggested by, for instance, Kojirna [1978) 01: Bhagwati [1987)5; 
the will to escape anti-dumping investigations; the need to be 
closer to customers and to support firms which have themselves 
set up' factories in Europe (cars, consumer electronics, 
,printers, .•. ) and are subjected to pressures to raise ther local-
'Content ratios; and, last but not least, financial support from 
European governments. For instance, Texas Instruments' investment 
.in Avezzano (Italy) in 1992 was half-funded by the Italian 
government; 
- failure of JESSI US$ 4.7 billion chip research project 
[VICKERY, 1992: 78-9). This pan-European support program, 
launched in 1989 for an initial period of seven years, was a 
high-profile EC project which has proven to be a glaring 
5 Kojima [1978) explains pure tariff-jumping investrnents 
while Bhagwati [1987) also anlayses preventive investments, such 
as those responding to protection threats or those directed to 
lower trade frictions. 
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disappointment, like, for instance, the high-definition TV 
programo JESS1 was not effective because it spre'aded too little 
,money • (one twentieth· of the·· Japanese . SC firms' effort on R&D) 
among too many companies and beca use Europe was already too far 
behind Japan and even South Korea in commodi ty memory chips. 
Philips pulled out. from memories in 1990 and Siemens defected 
sorne JESS1's projects to join IBM the same year and Toshiba in 
'1992. Moreover, this "technological mercantilism" [BARBET and 
LANZON1, 1993] has be en forced to retrench: in October 1991, 
JESS1 was scaled back and refocused; its budgetfor 1992 was cut 
by 25 percent below the original expected level, mainly because 
of a contribution from the EC which fell short of the promised 
financial support; since 1992, JESSI has concentráted in flagship 
projects closer to market needs, like lithography, applications 
and competitive manufacturing [DANCE, 1992: 64]. In September 
1991, JESSI and the US consortium SEMATECH agreed to collaborate 
after two years of talks. Budget cuts in both Europe and the US, 
.the will to face Japanese competition, the increasing complexity 
.~of SC manufacturing technologies, and complementary between know-
hows prompted cooperation. In practice, ,integration of 
development activities is yet limited to the so-called Autowec 
.(Automated Wafer Environment ContrOl) and has not been extended 
to other are as , mainly because of American industrialists' 
suspicions about JESSI's future. Its budget for 1993 (US$ 433 
million) is lower than the already reduced financial ability for 
1992 (US$ 500 million). JESSI's budget cutbacks are probably the 
result of political problems arising from the fact that this 
common project appears to benefit only a few countries, while 
,being paid for by all EC members. On the contrary, the US SC 
industry enjoys advantages arising from its links with the 
Department of Defense procurement section. The Japanese receive 
government subsidies through the highly successful strategic 
policy of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
{,MITI), directed to finance SC development through profits on 
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other electronic goods sales or even non-electronicproducts of 
the keiretsu [BOULT, 1992: 171] . 
' .. 
.. ~. , . .;., 
- growing technological and financial barriers to entry, 
which made difficult for European producers to recapture lost 
markets. For instance, DRAM storage capacity has been growing 
rapidly in the last years and is projected to raise even more 
quickly until the end of the decade. There are important hurdles 
in developing the next generation of DRAMs, with 64 and 256Mb 
capacity. The need toshrink circuit elements in order to comply 
wi th narrower line width (that is, the cri tical dimension of 
microminiature circuit patterns), which is projected to be only 
0.25 microns6 in 256Mb DRAMs, is coupled with the necessity of 
refinating optical lithography systems. Other technological risks 
are those associated wi th reliabili ty and cleanness: making-rooms 
must be virtually 100 per cent clean, so costly automation is 
1 needed in order to isolate equipment from human contacto 
Moreover, the high R&D cost (around US$ 1 billion for 256Mb 
DRAMs) has to be added to another billion or so for each 
manufacturing planto These high technological and financial 
requiremens (see Table 5) impose an extremely difficul t challenge 
" for the small and cash-trapped European firms. 
- the fragmentation of the European SC 
its nationalistic policies [HOBDAY, 1989 
impossible for EC producers to obtain large 
market, along with 
and 1991], made 
economies of scale 
and prevented the formation of a giant European maker, arising 
from the merging, as recommended by a report commissioned by the 
French government [CGP, 1991], of the three leading European 
firms, financially able to compete with huge foreign companies. 
The prospects to merge the three main European chip makers have 
6 A micron is a millionth of a meter, that is, 1(300th the 
thickness of human hair. 
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faded, partly because of the agreement between siemens and IBM-
Toshiba and partly because of the different polltical attitudes 
towar~s trade and, subsidies "xn the German 'arid Frenchj1talian 
governments. 
finally, Europeans are increasingly concentrating on 
Application Specific 1ntegrated circuits (AS1Cs). They have 
abandoned their ambitions to compete with the Japanese and the 
Koreans in commodity memories and with the US in microprocessors. 
In 1990, Siemens abandoned its plans to manufacture its own 16Mb 
device and decided to collaborate wi th 1BM' s factories in Europe. 
As already noted, Philips pulled all together from memories the 
same year. As European companies are marginal producers of DRAMs 
(Siemens is the only Europen producer making these devices) and 
microprocessors, and because AS1Cs are more suitable to areas 
requiring extended capability7, this strategy mat be a rational 
choice. Nevertheless, it,is subjected to a growing pressure from 
"US and Japanese subsidiaries in Europe, which were initially 
¡directed towards the DRAM market. Foreign facilities in Europe, 
such as those of Motorola, Intel, Fujitsu and Toshiba, are now 
'making inroads in this important segment of the continent's SC 
industry. 
The European SC crisis further aggravated since 1990. SC 
divisons of the three main European companies plunged into red 
or increased their already substantial losses. stiffer 
competition from North-american and Asian suppliers was a result 
of the US dollar decline towards European currencies and of South 
Korean and Taiwanese firms and even Japanese steel makers 
entering the market. The subsequent oversupply sharply lowered 
prices: for instance, 4Mb DRAM unit price declined from US$ 60 
7 AS1es reduce power consumption, component size and fault 
potential, enhance product quality and lower costs. 
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in January 1990 to US$ 25 in December 1990, to US$ 15 in December 
1991 and to US$ 11-14 in March 1992 [ECE, 1993: 229]. Another 
reason, for this,'decline was the 'acute-"demand contraction caused 
by the worldwide economic recession, the crisis in the computer 
market, and political-inspired cutbacks in military spending 
[BOULT, 1992: 170]. 
The early 1990s decline has raised concerns. Some fear that, 
if the ability to design and produce SCs in Europe fades or 
disappears, even Europe's still healthy telecommunications, 
machine tool and robotic industries may fall prey to big and 
integrated Japanese companies [BUSINESS WEEK, 1991]. 
Having faced these realities, European firms are now 
implementing cost-cutting measures, focusing on specialized 
chips, forming alliances with,overseas companies and trying to 
fobtain more government subsidies. Scaling back past ambitions, 
they are cutting on investmerit spending, slashing payroll and 
transferring assemby to low-wage countries. They have made a 
noticeable percentage of their workforce redundant. Siemens has 
recently relocated chip assembly from high-cost Bavaria to 
~ingapore and Malaysia. This latter trend seems to re-edit past 
.p+ocesses, such as the relocation of the US SC assemby to 
Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s in order to reduce labor 
costs and take advantage of the US tariff structure, which 
imposed duties only on value added abroad in products made with 
US components [FLAMM, 1985; HENDERSON, 1989 and UNCTAD, 1990]. 
As a result, in 1980 90 percent of the total US imports of SCs 
were re-imports from US subsidiaries in Southeast Asia [SCOTT, 
1987]. 
A second reaction is more far-reaching. European companies 
are focusing on specialization in Erasable Programmable Read-only 
Memories (EPROMs) and ASIcs, that is, specialty circuits for 
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telecommunications (such as mobile phones), automobile equipment 
(full-injection systems) and consumer electronics. In 1992, SGS-
oCo <r:!1omson was .,3rd in the- ranking of' the main o producers of EPROMs, 
only behind AMD and Texas Instruments, reaching 14.5 per cent of 
world market. It was second in other specialty chips, such as 
EEPROMs (14.9 percent) and special SRAMs (13 percent in 1991)·. 
Nevertheless, the strategy, as already noted, seems risky. 
Depressed markets in commodity DRAMs are pushing Japanese 
subsidiaries in Europe, such as those of Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi 
and Toshiba, into ASICs [BUSINESS WEEK, 1992). 
Thirdly, European companies are forming alliances, in the 
form of pártnerships or joint ventures, with °foreign firms. The 
growing costs of design and manufacturing and the will to 
circunvent national antimonopoly laws are pushing towards 
international agreements at the firm's level. Siemens joined IBM 
~ in 1990 to share R&D costs in 64Mb DRAMs and to start production 
~of 16Mb DRAMs at the US firm's factory at Corbeil-Essones outside 
o,paris. Japan's Toshiba .was added in July 1992 to design and 
Aevelop 256Mb DRAMs. In May 1993, SGS-Thomson reached an 
agreement with Mitsubishi in order to co-produce the so-called 
flash memory chips. The entry of °the European companies into this o 
ostrategic gamble seems tohave begun later than inoNorth-America 
or Japan. During 1980-90, 160 agreements of this kind were 
detected by Barbet and Lanzoni [1993), but the bulk were US-Japan 
alliances (AMD-Fujitsu, Texas Instruments-Hitachi,' Motorola-
Toshiba, AT&T-NEC, Intel-Sharp, and so on). As the need to find 
partners in order to spread the technologcal and financial risks 
has become imperativa, a more pronounced implication of European 
producers in this process may appear to be urgently needed. 
Finally, sorne European firms, faced to little financial 
• Electronique Internationale Hebdo, 11 February 1993. 
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assistance from JESSI, have been able to get direct government 
support. Por instance, SGS-Thomson got in November 1992 US$ 1.8 
billi,on ;from the French and ,·Ita:üan governments" for the' 1993-97 
periodo 
3. THE SOUTH KOREAN SC INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPACT ON EUROPE 
In 1992 South Korea was the 6th world producer in electronic 
goods, the 4th in components, the 3rd in consumer electronics and 
the 2nd in DRAMs [GLABI, 1993: 56]. The 4Mb DRAM world market is 
dominated by the Japanese, but South Korea ranks second, with a 
market share higher than those of the US and Germany combined 
(Table 6). 
SCs are the single most important electronic product 
exported by South Korea. According to figures from the 
,Electronics Industry Association of Korea (EIAK), SC exports will 
grow 30 percent in 1993 from ayear earlier and will account for 
nearly 29 percent of Korea's total electronic exports9 • 
South Korea's share of the US DRAM market has grown 
t8pectacularly in recent years: 0.1 per cent in 1985, 5 per cent 
.in. 1987 [SAGHAFI and DAVIDSON, 1989: 62], 15 percent in 1990, 19 
percent in 1991 and nearly 40 percent in 1992. This trend has 
prompted reactions among US SC producers: Micron Technologies 
presented in 1992 a lawsuit alleging that South Korean companies 
were dumping their DRAMs in the US (a similar move has been made 
by Siemens in Europe). What is paradoxical is that Korea' s 
Samsung Electronics started its large-scale production facilities 
of DRAMs back in 1983 with the help precisely of Micron 
• "L'électronique coréenne prépare un nouvel assaut", 
Electronique Internationale Hebdo, n" 85, 28 January 1993, p. 6. 
Technologies' °. 
Production and;· exports of DRAMs "have consisteiltly 
South Korea. From a very narrow base of US$ 100 million 
output grew to US$ 1.2 billion in 1988 and reached 
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grown in" 
in 1984, 
US$ 2.5 
billion in 1992, with exports accounting for US$ 1 billion. 
Moreover, some South Korean SC producers are becoming 
increasingly involved in state-of-the-art technology. In December 
1992, Samsung reached an agreement with Toshiba for the co-
production of flash memory 'chips (which, unlike DRAMs, retain 
information after the power is turned off) in 1994" . Scheduled 
for eight years, the partnership involves the transfer of so-
called NAND technology and patents from Toshiba in exchange of 
the financial and manufacturing muscle of Samsung, which is 
already the second biggest world manufacturer of DRAMs, behind 
precisely Toshiba. In March 1993, in an unprecedented move, 
Bamsung licensed technology for the production of 16Mb DRAMs to 
Japan's oki Electric. So, South Korea's SC industry, like its 
entire electronics sector, has already reached a high profile in 
the world market [BLOOM, 1992]. 
This trend is specially worth-noting because electronics 
only emerged as the dominant export industry in the late 1970s. 
Large-volume production of SCs did not start until the mid-1980s 
[SUAREZ-VILLA and HAN, 1990: 273]. Before the late 1970s, South 
Korea was a low-cost assembly base for 'export-oriented SC 
multinationals [DAVIS and HATANO, 1985]. As in the whole region 
of East and Southeast Asia, therelocation of US SC activities 
was confined to assembly and final testing, while wafer 
10 "New 
Semiconductor 
Review, 5 May 
Kids on the Block. Dumping Suits Put Korean 
Makers on the Defensive", Far. Eastern Economic 
1992, pp. 60-1. 
11 "Quick as a Flash. Japanese and Korean Chipmakers Form 
Alliance", Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 January 1993, p. 57. 
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manufacturing, circuit design and wafer processing continued to 
be located in the US [YOUNG, 1991: 201]. Nevertheless, the 
development of consumer electronié"S" and computéi- production by 
local firms increased domestic demand for SCs. Korean firms 
started in the early 1980s to make large investments in design 
and manufacturing facilities, in part to serve that market [ERNST 
and O'CONNOR, 1992: 209] and al so to catch up with Japan and to 
benefit from the externalities of SC production into the entire 
electronics sector [CHAPONNIERE, 1989]. 
The trend accelerated during the slump in the SC world 
market in the mid-1980s, when US and Japanese chipmakers were 
retrenching while Samsung and Hyundai, with then a ver y small 
proportion of international trade in sCs, made heavy investments 
in design and manufacturing [YOUNG, 1991: 204]. This was the 
,second of the major export-driven take offs in Korean electronics 
production, since the first, in the mid-1970S, involved mainly 
consumer articles. Moreover, 
strong barriers to entry, 
technological intensity, the 
SC activity featured in the 1980s 
such as high and increasing 
need for efficient scale12 , large 
capital requirements, considerable uncertainty about prospects, 
~navalaibility of product and process technology and 
aggressiveness from competitors, specially fromJapaneselarge 
cOlilpanies [MODY, 1990: 298]. Such barriers normally deter late 
entrants [YOON, 1992: 254]. So, it is fa ir to conclude that "the 
development of advanced semiconductor manufacturirig capaci ty 
marks a high point in the evolution of the Korean electronics 
industry, and, indeed, must be considered a landmark in Korean 
economic development" [MODY, 1990: 298). 
The rnain reasons explaining this phenomenal success may be 
12 Unlike Japan, South Korea lacked in the 1970s a large 
domestic rnarket able to produce the economies óf scale necessary 
to underpin the export drives. 
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.' summarized as f0110ws. Firstly, the US-Japan 1986 agreement on 
SCs (renewed in 1992) was an excellent opportunity for South 
.Ko¡;-ean. ,makers .,The agreenrent established a' 1'loor price for 
Japanese DRAMs imported in the US and forced Japan to pledge to 
raise the foreign share of i ts domes tic SC market from 8.5 
percent in 1985 to 20 percent in 1991. Although the latter goal 
was only attained, after considerable pressure from the US 
government, in the fourth quarter of 1992, the agreement enabled 
Korean manufacturers (Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Electronics, 
Goldstar Electron, ... ) to slash DRAM prices in the US, quoting 
them to customers at up to 10 percent below the level agreed,on 
by Japanese producers, and also to increase their exports to 
Japan. 
Secondly, the existence of very large and vertically-
integrated conglomerates (the chaebol) was an'important factor 
".behind South Korean success. The chaebol were able to finance the 
i.nitial losses in the SC business with profits from other 
divisions in the same firm, to use up to 20 percent of their SC 
output in the company's own personal computers and video 
machines, and to spend heavily on R&D and even in high-tech 
'laboratories in the US [ECONOMIST, 1989; CHAPONNIERE, 1992]. 
Thirdy, while the product cycle has lenghtened (such as in 
4Mb DRAMs) , benefitting new, entrants, Japan technologically 
upgraded its SC industry in the late 1980s, concentrating its 
resources in 16Mb and 64Mb DRAMs, so Korea could fill the 4Mb 
niche. 
Fourthly, the price downturn in SCs, caused by massi ve 
excessive production capacity in Japan, prompted financial 
problems in the Japanese integrated electronics companies, which 
decided in the late 1980s to cut production targets and review 
capital investroent in SCs, in an atteropt to bolster prices. The 
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Koreans were able then to expand their SC capacity. 
"F,inally, the skilled. ando .oeheap workforce, along wi th 
carefully targeted help from the government, including a .very 
successful technological policy and 20 percent duties on imported 
SCs, ~fforded the South Korean companies with large advantages. 
It has also to be taken into account that the exportupsurge 
in South Korean SCs also related to the slowdown of the domes tic 
consumer electronics industry and to expanding overseas 
investments by the chaebol in TVs, VCRs, microwave ovens and so 
on [ERNST and O'CONNOR, 1992: 122]. 
South Korean SC production is heavily biased towards 
commodity SCs, such as DRAMs and SRAMs, so the country has to 
import the bulk of i ts requirements of microprocessors and ASICs. 
The result is that Korea's SC industry exhibits both a high 
export ratio (84 percent in 1992) and a high import'dependency 
ratio (84 percent in 1992). The bulk of foreign purchases is 
imported from Japan (40 percent), which exhibits a high trade 
purplus with Korea in SCs (US$ 1.06 billion in 1992). 
As South Korean companies are mainly low-end commodi ty 
producers and are weak in design and features, they will probably 
move into better designed products, such as 64Mb DRAMs and ASICs, 
a process which will surely intensify Korean pressure on the 
European SC industry. Moreover, the need of getting closer to 
customers (including Korean consumer electronics firms which have 
invested in the EC) and of defending themselves against dumping 
complaints will surely prompt a shift to overseas production of 
SCs by the chaebol [CHAPONNIERE, 1992]. It is likely then that 
South Korea may become another Japan in the,SC business, adding 
strong pressures on the already depressed European sector. 
Samsung Electronics has already joined Texas Instruments to co-
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produce DRAMs in Portugal13 • 
In ad,di tion, in o¡;der >to lessen i ts dependen ce on Japanese 
SC equipment, South Korea is even considering to forge links with 
SEMATECH, the consortium of 12 SC companies established in 1987 
by the US government, and with SEMI-SEMATECH, the US consortium 
of more than 400 US suppliers of equipment and material. South 
Korean would make cash contributions to SEMATECH and would be 
able to gain access to the entire technologies developed with 
significant US government's R&D funds. As Mr. Paek Man-ki, chief 
of the Semiconductor Industry Division at the Korean Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Energy, explains: "our basic policy is to 
promote industrial cooperation between the US and South Korea, 
specially in semiconductors, to lessen our dependence on Japanese 
technology,,14. 
Gordon E. Moore, chairman of Intel, has recently declared 
that the Japanese reign over semiconductors may be over, because 
of the heavy Korean capital investments and Tai wanese competi tors 
entering world markets. Dan Hutcheson, chairman of VLSI Research, 
suggests that Samsung's mass production technology is probably 
the world's best and that this company's capital investments are 
now bigger than those of the Japanese'O • 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The crisis of the European SC industry has be en prompted by 
13 "International Electronics Giants Join Hands in 
Semiconductor Technology", The Korea Herald, 31 December 1992. 
14 "Koreans Ponder Sematech Links", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 20 August 1992, pp. 58-9. 
10 "Japan' s Chip Market Reign May be Over", The Nikkei 
Weekly (Tokyo), 16 November 1992. 
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stiff competition from imports, massive inward investments by 
overseas firms, failure of pan-European JESSI project, growing 
tecJ;lJ;lOlogical, and financial barriers" to entry as the sector 
upgrades, and the fragmentation of the European market, together 
with the nationalistic policies pursued in the Ee, which made 
impossible the creation of a single big European maker. 
Although European firms are implementing strategies in order 
to recapture lost markets, the present trends suggest that the 
European se industry may be adversely affected in coming years 
by an exacerbated international competition. To the pressures 
from US and Japanese big companies, it has to be nowadays added 
the growing impacts of new entrants, such as those from South 
Korean producers, whose achievements in recent y~ars have be en 
..impressi ve. 
South Korea is already the second world manufacturer of 
DRAMs, after Japan, as it surpassed the US in 1992. In 1992, the 
Korean share of the worldwide DRAM market was 24 percent (15 
percent in 1990), while Japan's market-share shrank from 61 to 
54 percent over the same period16 • Korea's Samsung Electronics 
is already the first world producer of DRAMs, as it surpassed 
Japan's Toshiba in 1992. Samsung's inroads, besides those of the 
electronics divisions of the other chaebol (Hyundai and 
Goldstar), allowed South Korea to dominate in 1992 40 per cent 
of the US DRAM market. The strong investment capacity of these 
companies, along with their huge R&D budgets, suggest that Korea 
will be an even more impressi ve comp'eti tor in the next few years. 
A depressed se sector like the European one should turn i ts 
attention much more to South Korea, as this new entrant may 
become another Japan in the se business. 
16 E. Lachica, "Korea 's Growth PutsJapan on Guard. DRAM 
shortage a boon for Korean chip makers", Asian Wall Street 
Journal Weekly, 15 November 1993, Supplement, p. 2B. 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
TABLE 1. WORLD SC MARKET SHARES BY FIRMS' NATIONi\LITY . 
1979 1982 1985 1992 
-- -- -- --
European 16 13 12 10 
US 46 51 42 41 
. 
. Japanese 38 35 42 43 
Other - 1 4 6 
-- -- -- --
Total 100 100 100 100 
Souces: Hobday, 1991: 81; CGP, 1991: 216 and Dataquest figu-
res, January 1993. 
. TABLE 2. TEN LARGEST SC's MANUFACTURERS, 1992 (sales and 
.. < 
world market shares, US$ billion and percentage). 
• Sales Market Share 
1. Intel (US) 5.1 7.7 
2. NEC (Japan) 4.9 7.6 
3 . Toshiba (Japan) 4.7 7.3 
. ~ 4. Motorola (US) 4.6 7.1 
5. Hitachi (Japan) 3.9 5.9 
6. Texas Instruments (US) 3.0 4.6 
7. Fujitsu (Japan) 2.6 3.9 
8. Mitsubishi (Japan) 2.3 3.5 
9. Philips (Netherlands) 2.1 3.2 
10. Matsushita (Japan) 1.9 2.9 
Source: Dataquest figures, January 1993. 
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TABLE 3. EUROPEAN MARKET SHARES, BY FIRMS' NATIONALITY 
1979 1985 1992 
-- -- --
European 43.4 38.3 34.0 
US 53.7 50.4 45.1 
Japanese 3.0 11.3 16.5 
Other - - 4.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Dataquest figures, 1990 and 1993 
TABLE 4. TOP-TEN SUPPLIERS IN THE EUROPEAN MARKET, 1990 and 
1992 (companies and market share) 
1990 1992 
Companies Market Share Companies Market Share 
1. Philips 10.3 1. Philips 9.2 
2. Siemens 9.0 2. Intel 9.1 
3. SGS-Thomson 8.5 3. Motorola 7.9 
4 . Motorola 7.2 4. Siemens 7.4 
5. Texas Instruments 6.0 5. SGS-Thomson 7.3 
6. Intel 5.8 6. Texas Instr. 5.7 
7. Toshiba 4.9 7. Toshiba .3.9 
8. NEC 4.1 8. NEC 3.8 
9. National Sem. 3.6 9. National Sem. 3.4 
10. AMD 2.6 10. AMD 2.8 
Source: Dataquest figures, 1991 and 1993 
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TABLE 5. SUCC;:ESIVE GENERATIONS OF·DRAMs 
" 
Capacity Line Width (microns) Year R&D Cost ($m) 
--
1Mbit 1.2 1985 100 
4Mbit 0.8 1988 200 
16Mbit 0.6 1991 350 
64Mbit 0.35 1995 600 
256Mbit 0.25 1999 1,000 
. 
Source: Business Week, 1992. 
TABLE 6. 4Mb DRAM world market share, by country of manufac-
turer, 1991 
Japan 80.2 
; South Korea 13.4 
US 4.6 
Germany 1.8 
Total 100.0 
Source: Dataquest figures, cit. in Butler ánd Thomson [1991] 
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